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Abstract e
..
gies lo d · ost analys¡s 1s often viewed as applying basic principies and cost methodolornakin etenrune total system cost. These finished estimates then flow into a decision estima~ process and the cost estimator leaves the stage. Reality shows that the cost introct or" actually one of the main contributors to the decision malcing process. Our Uctlon to this · 1 · · · · 1 in pro spec1a lSsue explores the areas where cost esumanng plays a maJar ro e articl gram management in areas beyond the normal program estímate. We ha ve included es that sho th k · · d evaluaf w e ey role cost estimators can play in source selecnon strateg1es an rnethoct100; cost. of delay analysis for management decisions, eamed value management rnent s topredlct program costs; decision criteria to rank competing projects that compledevel~achtional cost-based methods; anda new methodology for determining research and pment budget profiles.
The Relationship Between Cost Analysis and Program Management "l believe that without concerted attention to the problems in acquisition, logistics, and industrial practices and procedures, the technological edge that is our war-fighter's greatest advantage could be eroded." Darleen Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition (Druyun, 2001) 
INfRODUCTION
The United S tates is an undisputed super power with access to the best technol~ gies and information systems. In this environment coupled with increased defense spe~ -ing, one would expect Department ofDefense (DoD) decision makers would be confr~~ung fewer challenges. The reality of course is quite different. Wbile we do have the best.rmhtai)' in the world, maintaining it in a future of ill-defined and sometimes conflicting requtrementsd · · · perations an presents a maJar challenge. We suffer from aging weapon systems, nsmg o support costs and declining manpower with increasing operations.
be t Addressing these challenges requires that our decision makers receive t~e .
t nalysts mto ana ysts an analysts that the nation can provide. The integrat10n o cos a th d · · · can make the ese ectstons ts needed so that the senior leadership and program mangers best use of DoD's scarce resources. As stated in the above quote, we ha ve many proble~~ that must be sol ved to maintain our 1eading position and cost ana1ysis can help us to arn at the better decisions. Traditionally when one addresses the analyses provided by cost analysts, the subject is focused on: l. Developing cost improvement curves; 2 Collecting an appropriate data set to develop those curves; · 3 · l!sing the data to derive cost estimating re1ationships (CER's) with the best stattstlcal characteristics· ' 4 · Utilizing available tools creatively to simplify the estimating process; and/or 5 · Employing the best methodologies availab1e to produce a credible cost estímate (Kammerer2001 ). 
COSTSAVING INITIATIVF.SPROPOSED BYTIIECONfRACfOR
Defense contractors often propose cost saving initiatives to reduce the cost of ~eapon systems (Kammerer 2001) . In sorne cases these initiatives are associated with an mve~t~~nt. The retum on the investment yields savings in the production phase of the ~cqutsttion program. ng a manufacturing process that is more efficient significant cost savings cou1d be realized.
uch a change in process may require investment in new too1s or supply concepts, and a
:~:rra~gement of the workspace in the factory. In the case of the F-22, the con tractor has a o nctl that evaluates proposed PCRP's, the investment required, and the expected returnon-mvestment.
th
The evaluation of a PCRP presents a cost analyst with a threefold dilemma. First, is it e c~st saving initiative real or not? That is, does the cost saving initiative ha ve merit or is unhkely to produce savings? Second does the initiative represent a saving that wou1d nonna11 be ' .
o Y expected to occur as part of the normal cost improvement one expects m productJon and wh· h · · 11 h Ic IS captured by the historical cost improvement curve? Fma y, once t e cost an~lyst decides whether to accept or reject the cost saving initiative, how do you deve1op the ~stímate of the savings that is subsequently subtracted from your baseline estímate? It is tmportant to track to a consistent baseline as the program changes that can be used to measure a d . n track any savmgs. In the case of the F-22 Air Force cost analysts ha ve provided detai1ed reviews for approximately 80 such cost sa;ing initiatives proposed by the contractor. These required ~veloping separate return-on-investment relationships that were tended to be lower than e contractor's forecasts. However the Air Force has gone on to fund severa] contractor proposed o . ' . mvestments that were JUdged to ha ve ment.
PROGRAMBUDGETS
Is the budget based on the cost estímate or the cost estímate based ono the budget ~~mmerer 2001)? The cost analyst often finds himself in the quanodary ofotrym~ to fit an Stírnate to a budget, and this presents a dilemma, which may questton th~ mtegn~ ?f the COst analyst. Heroic measures may even be proposed to keep the cost estimate wtthm ~e prescribed budget. For example, program proponents ha ve been kno"_Yn t? propose ap~lymg aH the Principies of acquisition reform to achieve a 20 percent reduction 10 the first umts of The Relatíonshíp Between Cost Analysis and Prograrn Management productíon. When asked exactly what they would do to achíeve such reductions, they are usually less specífic. But they know they will achíeve theír goal because everyone on the team knows the goal and will be working toward ít. The cost analyst must stand firm in such cases and not support such specious goals.
Other techniques proposed to keep the cost estímate withín the budget include the application of the Costas an Independent Variable (CAIV) technique, in which tradeoffs are made early in the development stages to reduce or stabilize costs. In the case of the F-22 aircraft program and the introductíon of cost savíngs through the PCRP's, nota single PCRP was accepted by the Aír Force wíthout specific plans that had worked their way up from an idea to a plan for ímplementation. This type of cost analysís allows the program manager to make a fact-based decision on whether to accept or decline contractor proposals.
New (Christensen 1996) . This new research confrrms that a CPI-based E~C ts a reasonable lower-bound to the final cost of a defense acquisition program when denved early in the program. However, in the later stages (70% complete), CPI-based EAC is no longer acts as a reliable lower bound. War. With the Cold eagan ~tldup, the DoD grew dramatically in an effort to win the Cold F'Y85 Ievels . th War o ver m the 1990s, the size of the DoD dropped by 39 percent from drastic red u ; 1 the Air Force budget dropping by almost 50 percent (Chelf 2002 A popular analysis method for large source selections is the best value decision. This method bases the decision on a total system evaluation that considers cost, technical, business performance o ver all aspects of the procurement (Borchers 2001 ) . The cost analyst is challenged to consider more than just the cost of the immediate contract, but rather to consider total costs, benefits and risks to the govemment, or purchasing firm. This often requires the cost anal yst to determine a price for the value or cost of the benefit, cost or risk. This can be as simple as detennining the cost of extending an existing contract to evaluating the value of keeping and aircraft in the inventory an extra five years.
PROGRAM CHANGESANDUNCERfAINTY
A related method, Value Focused Thinking, offers an objective method to evaluate altematives over a variety of customers when faced with a limited budget. Lowe and Gale detail this approach in their paper "Laboratory Purchases: A Multidimensional Approac~."
This method takes organization values and goals and translates them into objectives. Usmg decision makers within the organization, altematives are ranked based on how well they meet the objectives. Alternatives are then chosen based on this ranking until the allotted budget is gone.
SUMMARY
As this brief introduction to the special issue on the relationship between cost analysis and program management shows, cost analysts play key roles in providing needed information to managers and decision makers. Indeed, we conclude that cost analysis and program management are inextricably linked. Together cost analysis and program management will play a decisive role in shaping future military and commercial competitiveness of the United S tates. The following four papers provide new techniques that decision makers can use to control schedule and program risk, while balancing scarce resources.
Author Biographical Infonnation
William Stockman, a senior as socia te at Da y ton Aerospace and was a professor the Air Force Institute of Technology and both teaches and performs research on cost analysis. Joseph Kammerer is the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Cost and Economics) for the Air Force in the Pentagon.
David King is an Air Force sponsored doctoral student researching the strategic i~ pacts of mergers and acquisition activity. Previously he has served on the faculty of the Atr Force Academy and as an acquisition manager.
Ste~e Oreen is a Professor in the Management Department at the Air Force AcademY· H~ recetved a DBA from United S tates lnternational University in 1987, and has served in the Atr Force as a cost analyst.
Mic~ael Grei~er is an Assistant Professor of Acquisition Management at the AFff. His research mterests mclude acquisition reform and its relationship with cost management,
